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II. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout this case, Defendant has passionately fought the charges against him, to his 
personal, financial, and professional detriment. This passionate defense should not be confused 
with a refusal to accept responsibility. To the contrary, when the Idaho State Bar levied charges 
against Defendant, he chose not to fight them. His decision was not because he lacked a legal 
defense: Professor Margaret Tarkington has thoroughly dismantled the state courts' 
Constitutional rationales for I.R.P.C. 8.2(a)1, including Idaho State Bar v. Topp., 129 Idaho 414 
(1996). Tarkington, 97 GEO L. J. at 1589. Though there existed truly compelling arguments that 
Defendant could not be disciplined, he chose to accept responsibility; thus, he offered no 
defense. 
But the case at bar is different. It is not merely a professional discipline case. It 
1s a criminal proceeding. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that "contempt is an 
extraordinary proceeding and [a potent weapon. It] should be approached with caution," 
because it is "readily susceptible of abuse and fraught with danger not only to personal liberties 
but to the respect and confidence which our courts must maintain. Although such a power is 
universally recognized as essential to an orderly and effective administration and execution of 
justice, it should be exercised with utmost caution." In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 281 (2005) 
(quotations omitted). 
In this extraordinary proceeding, it is critical that the law be scrupulously followed. 
Defendant has immense respect for the law, and emphatically believes that the law was not 
followed below. Therefore, while Defendant has accepted punishment from the Idaho State Bar, 
he cannot accede to allegations of "criminal conduct" when the conduct is not actually criminal. 
I am innocent. But all I really want is a fair shake from Idaho's judicial system. 
1 Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial 
Reputation, 97 GEO. L. J. 1567 (2009). 
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III. ARGUMENT IN REPLY2 
A. Jurisdiction and Due Process 
1. I.C.R. 42 
Hundreds of pages of paper have been sacrificed to this case; yet, this is an absurdly easy 
case. The state has devoted zero words to this case's dispositive issue: the applicability and 
requirements of I.C.R. 42.3 See, State's Br. pp. 5-7. The state has not disputed Defendant's 
contention that the case was "brought in connection with a criminal proceeding." The state also 
has not argued that the proceeding was in connection with a civil proceeding, or that it was a 
result of conduct separate from civil or criminal proceedings. In other words, it has not argued 
that I.R.C.P. 75 applies. 
Instead, the state has conceded that the relevant facts occurred "[i]n the course of the 
criminal proceedings[.]" State's Br. p. 1. Even Judge Sticklen stated that "This is a criminal 
contempt case that was brought in connection with the criminal case State v. Lorimor[.]" R. 
470. 
2 A note about semantics. Although criminal contempt is not a "crime," it is "a crime in the ordinary 
sense," and for purposes of federal Constitutional rights, indirect criminal contempt is treated virtually 
identically to crimes. Someone charged with contempt is a "respondent," not a "defendant," and one is 
not "convicted" of contempt but is instead "sanctioned." See generally, State v. Reynolds, 343 P.3d 496 
(Or.App. 2010). 
In this case, these terms have been misused by both sides, for a number of reasons. First, 
it is difficult to properly refer to the sanction as a "sanction," when the "sanctioning" document is 
titled "Judgment of Conviction." Second, "respondent" is a difficult term to use to refer to Defendant, 
because the state is the "respondent" on appeal. In addition, the Idaho Appellate Rules discourage 
use of "respondent" and "appellant." I.A.R. 35(d). Third, in a technical sense, Defendant arguably is a 
"contemnor," because he has been "adjudged to have committed an act of contempt." I.C.R. 42(a)(3). 
However, that term is not used for two reasons. Frankly, from an advocacy standpoint it is not advisable 
to refer to Defendant as a "contemnor," and second, an issue on appeal is whether there was actually 
an adjudication at all. Use of the term "contemnor" implies that Defendant is incorrect on the issue of 
whether there was an adjudication. Because Defendant is correct on that issue, "contemnor" is not used. 
Finally, Defendant is proceeding prose, and has found "Mr. Scott" (or, as the state would have it, "Scott") 
to be both awkward and surreal, inhibiting his ability to focus on the issues at hand. "Defendant" is the 
best of the above undesirable terms. 
3 Below, the state argued that I.C.R. "42 is dealing only with not criminal contempt but the crime of 
contempt. It specifically references at 18-1801." Tr. p. 66, In. 5-8. Magistrate Manweiler stated "I do 
find the state's position is well founded." Tr. p. 66, 11. 16-17. I.C.R. 42, however, states the exact opposite 
proposition as that advanced by the state, and found to be "well founded" by Juvenile Magistrate 
Manweiler. I.C.R. 42 states that it "shall not apply to ... section 18-1801, Idaho Code, or any other 
criminal statute." 
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I.C.R. 42 applies here, because it applies to "all" contempts in connection with a criminal 
case, and the motion was filed in a criminal case. Nonsummary proceedings are commenced 
"only" as I.C.R. 42(c) provides. It requires an affidavit, but none was supplied; thus, the 
sanction is jurisdictionally void. No additional analysis is needed to decide the case. See, e.g., 
Athay v. Rich County, 153 Idaho 815, 823-24 (2012) ("the requirement for an accompanying 
affidavit in I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7) is mandatory. [T]he Appellant procedurally defaulted on this 
ground by failing to file an affidavit to accompany his motion for a new trial.") (citations, 
quotations omitted). 
It also is worth noting that the Idaho Judicial Council requires verification of complaints 
against judges. See, Rule 28 of the Rules of the Idaho Judicial Council. In fact, unverified 
complaints will not even be considered. In its 2012 Annual Report, the Judicial Council stated, 
on p. 10, that it "generally acts only on verified complaints," and on pp. 13-14, that "Of the 96 
complaints received in 2012, forty-three (43) were not verified as required by Idaho law." 
www.judicialcouncil.idaho.gov/2o12_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf. Those forty-three complaints 
were not addressed by the Council. The Judicial Council requires the public to strictly comply 
with verification requirements regarding judicial complaints. Defendant submits that the 
Judiciary would not inspire the public's confidence if it exempted itself from a similar 
requirement in cases involving judge-initiated criminal charges premised on concern for a 
magistrate's reputation. 
2. I.R.C.P. 75 
For the first time on appeal, the state argues that the motion to withdraw was a 
document "prepared by court personnel" under I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1). State's Br., pp. 7-8. Defendant 
has explained that this language is essentially the Idaho Supreme Court's legislative recognition 
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of the hybrid contempt principle described in its case law. I.C.R. 42(c)(1)4 makes this fact clear. 
The state has ignored this point, a point that contradicts its position. Regardless, the state's 
interpretation of the "prepared by court personnel" language would render that language 
virtually without meaning and therefore should be rejected. "[E]ffect must be given to all the 
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475 (2007) (quotations omitted). 
I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) requires an affidavit "unless the facts recited in it are based upon 
the judge's personal knowledge and/or upon information from the court file contained in 
documents prepared by court personnel." According to the state, "prepared by court personnel" 
means "court personnel's role in organizing and maintaining a court file in a pending case." 
State's Br., p. 8. However, all documents in a court file are, by the very nature of a court file, 
"organized and maintained" by court personnel. Therefore, if the Idaho Supreme Court desired 
to apply the state's definition of "prepared by court personnel," it would have simply omitted 
the "prepared by court personnel" language, and instead stated that an affidavit was required 
"unless the facts recited in it are based upon information from the court file." In other words, 
the state's proposed interpretation eliminates any meaning from the language "prepared by 
court personnel." 
Clearly, the Idaho Supreme Court intended to employ the definition of "prepare" that 
means "to put into written form <prepare a report>." www.merriam-webster.com 
(search "prepare") (italics supplied). Unlike the state's interpretation of "prepare," this 
definition actually gives meaning to the term. In addition, and again unlike the state's proposed 
interpretation, it is fully consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's legislative recognition of the 
principle of hybrid contempt. Recall that hybrid contempt applies when someone fails to appear 
4 "Order to show cause. If the alleged contempt consists of failing to appear in court, the contempt 
proceedings may be commenced by an order to show cause directed to the respondent. The order to show 
cause must be supported by an affidavit unless it is prepared by or at the direction of the judge and 
the facts recited in it are based upon the judge's personal knowledge and/or upon information from the 
court file contained in documents prepared by court personnel." 
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in court after receiving notice to appear (which is prepared by court personnel). 
Regarding the "personal knowledge" affidavit exception, the state argues that "Judge 
Watkins did not rely on any factual information extrinsic to [Defendant's] motion or any 
statements made by others in initiating the contempt charge." State's Br. p. 6. That is a patently 
false statement. It has never been contended - nor could it reasonably be - that the authoring 
and filing of the motion was not a factual requisite for the charge. The state admits as much: 
"the act of contempt was completed upon [Defendant's]filing of the motion" State's Br. 
p. 6. It even argues that "the QlliJJ. pure factual finding the magistrate court was required to 
make . .. was that [Defendant] willfully authored and filed the motion to withdraw." State's 
Br., p. 26. 
Yet the state claims, without citation to the record or authority, that Magistrate Watkins 
possessed personal knowledge of the "only"5 facts he needed to find - that Defendant authored 
and filed the motion. The state has cited no definition of "personal knowledge" that would 
encompass acts that occurred outside one's presence, such as the filing of a motion.6 Instead, 
that fact was supported only by admissions, and not by personal knowledge. Again, it is patently 
false for the state to claim that Magistrate Watkins did not rely on "statements made by others." 
As established previously, he relied only on statements made by others with regard to whether 
the motion was filed. 
To accept the state's position that Magistrate Watkins possessed "personal knowledge" 
of "the specific facts constituting the alleged contempt," one must redefine the well-established 
meaning of "personal knowledge" described in Defendant's opening brief. Judge Sticklen 
expressed her willingness to do so, claiming that the term's meaning varies depending on 
5 Defendant categorically rejects the state's contention that no other factual findings were necessary. 
For example, the Written Charge alleged that the motion was "libelous," and therefore all elements of 
libel must have been proved. The Written Charge also claimed that "no purpose" could be served by the 
motion other than "to degrade the court and bring it into the contempt of the people." None of these 
allegations was proved. 
6 The opening brief, at pages 12-13, explains that, by all accounts (including Magistrate Watkins' account), 
the conduct occurred outside the magistrate's presence. 
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whether a case involved summary or nonsummary proceedings. Now the state has expressed 
the same willingness to deviate from the rule's plain language. State's Br. pp. 6-7. If this case 
involved summary proceedings, Judge Sticklen and the state presumably would conclude that 
Magistrate Watkins lacked personal knowledge of the specific facts constituting the alleged 
contempt. Because the case involved nonsummary proceedings, however, Judge Sticklen and 
the state concluded that Magistrate Watkins possessed personal knowledge of the specific facts 
constituting the alleged contempt. 
Never before has it crossed Defendant's mind that one's "personal knowledge" is 
dependent upon the proceedings one later initiates, as though the subsequent initiation of 
proceedings bestows personal knowledge, previously lacking, upon a judge. To the contrary, 
personal knowledge is not affected by the nature of the proceedings one initiates; the nature of 
the proceedings is affected by one's personal knowledge. If a judge possesses personal 
knowledge of all facts constituting the alleged contempt, he usually may conduct summary 
proceedings, and may proceed without an affidavit in cases not brought in connection with a 
criminal proceeding. If the judge lacks the requisite personal knowledge, he cannot conduct 
summary proceedings and cannot proceed without an affidavit. 
The state emphasizes that summary proceedings require that the conduct occur in a 
judge's immediate presence, whereas I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1) requires personal knowledge. State's Br. 
pp. 6-7. Quite true. And quite irrelevant. I.R.C.P. 75(c) addresses personal knowledge; thus, 
the issue is whether Magistrate Watkins possessed personal knowledge. In Defendant's 
opening brief, he discussed Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925), in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized that a judge cannot have personal knowledge of contempt, when 
the contempt is based on a document submitted to the judge outside of the judge's presence. 
Opening Br., p. 12. That decision therefore rested on the proposition that a confession to 
authoring a document does not confer personal knowledge upon the listener. The issue is 
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personal knowledge, not immediate presence. 
Regardless, the U.S. Supreme Court is clear that the difference between "immediate 
presence" and "personal knowledge" is that personal knowledge is more stringent. In re Oliver 
explained: 
for a court to exercise the extraordinary but narrowly limited power to punish 
for contempt without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, the court-
disturbing misconduct must not onb, occur in the court's immediate 
presence, but that the judge must have personal knowledge of it 
acquired by his own observation of the contemptuous conduct. [K]nowledge 
acquired from the confession of the accused[] would not [suffice]. 
333 U.S. 257, 274-75 (1948). 
A personal knowledge requirement is more stringent than an immediate presence 
requirement, because conduct may occur in one's immediate presence and still not involve 
personal knowledge. For example, a raised middle finger may occur in a judge's immediate 
presence, but if the judge had averted his eyes, he did not possess personal knowledge of the 
conduct. Because "personal knowledge" is more stringent than "immediate presence," the 
state argues irrelevantly when it identifies the "immediate presence" language in I.R.C.P. 75. 
The state simply makes no attempt to explain how a judge can possess personal knowledge of 
conduct that occurs outside his presence. 7 
3. Charging Document 
Defendant identified four jurisdictional defects in the charging document. The state did 
not address the mens rea pleading requirement. It is uncontested. In fact, the state argues that 
it was necessary to prove that Defendant "willfully authored and filed the motion to withdraw." 
7 The state wonders what the affidavit, if it had been submitted, should have alleged. State's Br., p. 
6. First of all, it is not Defendant's duty to inform the state what it should have done. Defendant was 
the person charged, not the entity charging contempt. It is quite troubling indeed that the state does 
not know what it should have charged in an initiating affidavit. If the state wanted use an affidavit to 
establish that the motion had been filed, perhaps the initiating affidavit could have come from the court 
clerk who accepted it for filing. The affidavit did not need to be based on personal knowledge, but only 
information or belief. Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 244 (2007) ("providing an affidavit to the best of 
one's knowledge is the very essence of what an affidavit is"). That is essentially what occurred in Jones v. 
Jones, 91 Idaho 578, 580 (1967) ("On November 24, 1964, the clerk of the district court filed an affidavit 
in said court and cause, which alleged [certain facts purporting to constitute contempt.]") 
7 
State's Br., p. 26. By the state's own admission, the charging document therefore is deficient 
and the contempt sanction is void. The state has contended, contrary to Judge Sticklen's and 
Magistrate Watkins' conclusion, that LC. § 7-601-1. does not apply; therefore, the state fails to 
address the facts required by that statute. If that statute applies, the charging document is 
deficient and the contempt sanction is void. 
The state also appears to argue that the allegations were sufficient to allege common 
law contempt. The state's argument does not address the specific defects Defendant identified, 
instead alleging that the allegations were generally good enough for common law contempt. 
State's Br., pp. 10-11. However, even if the state's point had addressed a relevant issue, it 
remains incorrect. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[a]t common law, the 
criminal contempt power was confined to sanctions for conduct that interfered 
with the orderly administration of judicial proceedings." United States. v. Dixon, 
509 U.S. 688, 694 (1993). Similarly, Idaho states that contempt is needed for "an orderly and 
effective administration and execution of justice[.]" In re Weick, supra. Again, contempt 
protects proceedings, not judges.8 Nothing in the Written Charge meets these common law 
requirements. 
Next, the state argues that the charging document did not need to include an allegation 
that the conduct occurred in Idaho, apparently because there exists a difference between 
contempt charges and criminal complaints/informations/indictments. State's Br. pp. 12-13. 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court was clear that "the court in Jones[, 91 Idaho 578] ... 
adopted the criminal law rule that a criminal court acquires no subject matter jurisdiction 
8 The state cites several direct contempt cases involving summary ounishment. State's Br., pp. 
10-11. Recall that speech is "extremely circumscribed" when "in the courtroom itself. during a 
judicial proceeding." Opening Br., pp. 17, 21, 30-31. For direct criminal contempt cases involving 
summary proceedings, the interests at stake always involve the need for order in the courtroom. It 
is a Constitutional prerequisite for the initiation of summary proceedings. See, I.C.R. 42(b)(1)-c. 
(incorporating the Constitutional requirement that "the conduct [constituting] contempt disturbs the 
court's business.") All cases cited by the state therefore involved a disturbance of the court's business, in 
contrast to this case. 
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unless the initiating accusatory document (indictment, information or complaint) is sufficiently 
particular to state a public offense." State v. Palmlund, 95 Idaho 150, 153 (1972). Therefore, "in 
order to state a public offense, the accusatory document must recite all the requisite elements of 
the offense." Id. One such element is that the conduct occurred within the jurisdiction. State v. 
Mowrey, 91 Idaho 693, 695 (1967). There is no relevant distinction between the contempt 
pleading rule and the criminal law rule, because the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the criminal 
law rule for contempt cases. Because a criminal law pleading is jurisdictionally deficient if it 
does not allege that the conduct occurred in Idaho, it necessarily follows (under the same rule) 
that a contempt pleading is likewise deficient. The sanction is void. 
Finally, the state makes no attempt to dispute the fact that an allegation of libel is a bare 
legal conclusion, recited with no particularity. Thus, the charge is defective and void. 
B. First Amendment and Vagueness 
1. Standard of Review 
The state erroneously states the standard of review for First Amendment cases, citing 
two due process cases for the proposition that the "clearly erroneous" standard applies to the 
review of factual determinations. State's Br., p. 14. Defendant's opening brief cited to First 
Amendment contempt and libel cases, not due process cases, in support of the proposition that 
"an independent examination of the facts ... is required." Opening Br., p. 18. Defendant's 
recitation of the law is correct, while the state's recitation is plainly wrong. 
2. The State does not Contend that the Statements were False, that 
they were made with Actual Malice, or that they Caused an Imminent 
Threat to the Administration of Justice. 
The state has not attempted to refute Defendant's contention that the statements in the 
motion to withdraw are true, that he believed they were true, and that they caused no imminent 
threat to the administration of justice. The state has failed to reconcile its passive approach 
with the U.S. Supreme Court's statements that "the New York Times rule[] absolutely prohibits 
punishment of truthful criticism," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 US 64, 78 (1964), and "concern 
for the dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment as criminal 
9 
contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision . . . even though the utterance contains 'half-
truths' and 'misinformation.' Such repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and 
present danger of the obstruction of justice." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 
(1964) (citations omitted). The state refuses to tell this Court that the statements were false or 
disruptive. That refusal is telling enough. 
The state does appear to argue that the statements were not criticism or that Defendant 
was not punished for his criticism. State's Br., p. 19 ("Scott attempts to characterize the 
statements in his motion to withdraw as simply criticisms and beliefs regarding the capabilities 
and integrity of Judge Watkins, and the criminal contempt judgment as simply punishment of 
these constitutionally protected criticisms.") It is difficult to understand the state's contention 
that the statements in the motion were not criticism, or that the criminal punishment was not 
directed at the motion's criticism. The statements were criticism. Defendant was punished 
for the critical statements. The Written Charge is unequivocal. It alleged that the statements 
were "libelous," and "serve[d] no purpose other than to bring the court into the contempt of the 
people.'' It was directed at the reputational effect of the statements in the motion to withdraw, 
which therefore triggered the applicability of the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment libel 
and criminal contempt cases. 
3. The State's Proposed Proscription, Raised for the First Time on 
Appeal, is Vague and Overbroad 
First of all, Judge Sticklen upheld Defendant's conviction based on LC. § 7-601-1., and 
this Court directly reviews the district court's decision. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 
672 (2008). The state has admitted that Judge Sticklen "utilized LC. § 7-601, which contains 
examples of types of acts and omissions that constitute contempt, to support its conclusion that 
the conduct alleged in this case actually constituted contempt." State's Br., p. 25. Defendant's 
conviction was upheld based on the J.C. § 7-601-1. example of contempt. For example, Judge 
Sticklen reasoned that Defendant had notice that LC.§ 7-601-1. applied: 
10 
Scott was sufficiently provided with notice of the charge prior to the imposition 
of sanctions. While the written charge did not precisely recite every word of LC. § 
7-601, the written charge of contempt specifically noted that the proceeding was 
initiated against him "for disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior towards 
a judge," for "no purpose other than to degrade the court and bring it into the 
contempt of the people." Written Charge of Contempt Against Attorney Eric 
Scott; Notice to Appear, at 1-2. Consequently, Scott was informed of the nature 
of the conduct and that the conduct served no purpose except to degrade the 
court and bring it into the contempt of the people (in other words, it disrupted 
the judicial process) .... Scott apparently received sufficient notice of the 
applicability of I.C. § 7-601 to his charge because he specifically questioned, 
through counsel, Judge Watkins concerning whether his conduct occurred "while 
you were holding court" and whether it "interrupt[ed] any judicial proceedings?" 
August 31, 2011 Hearing Transcript, at 28. Judge Watkins testified that Scott's 
conduct caused "a significant delay" in the judicial proceedings. Id., at 28-29 
("[T]he delay is that we are taking up these proceedings and spending time on 
this rather than on the case itself.") .... 
R. 481-82. 
In analyzing Defendant's vagueness challenge, Judge Sticklen limited her analysis to 
whether LC. § 7-601 was unconstitutionally vague, even though Defendant had argued that a 
common law proscription, if applicable, would be vague. R. 312. The lower court's entire 
analysis, with only footnotes omitted, is reproduced as follows: 
While Scott argues that the charge was 'vague because court was not 
being held when the motions were ... filed ... therefore Defendant could not 
have fair warning that the statutes applied to him" (Appellant's Brief, at 53), the 
Court finds that the language in the statute concerning "holding the 
court" and "other judicial proceedings," are sufficiently broad that 
the contemptuous conduct need not have occurred in a hearing or 
trial setting only, but could also occur in a non-hearing and non-trial 
judicial setting, as occurred here. In sum, in the Court's view, there 
is no merit to Scott's assertion that he was not adequately informed 
of the charge against him. Scott also argues that I.C. § 7-601 is 
unconstitutionally vague. "[T]he vagueness issue is whether the proscription 
lends itself to arbitrary enforcement on a subjective, case-by-case basis. Those 
who enforce a proscription-in the case of contempt, judges-must be guided by 
explicit standards. Otherwise, the proscription could be enforced arbitrarily and 
subjectively on a case-by-case basis." Appellant's Brief, at 55. 
"There is a strong presumption of the validity of an ordinance and an 
appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its 
constitutionality. A statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical 
interpretation can be given it." State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 
246 (1998). "A void for vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged 
and a more stringent vagueness test will be applied where a statute imposes 
a criminal penalty." 132 Idaho at 198, 969 P.2d at 247. LC. § 7-601, again, 
states that "[t]he following acts or omissions in respect to a court of justice, or 
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proceedings therein, are contempts of the authority of the court: 1. Disorderly, 
contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court, 
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceedings." The 
statute, therefore, proscribes "[d]isorderly, contemptuous or insolent 
behavior toward the judge." It then goes on to provide that this 
behavior must be such that it rises to the level of disrupting "the due 
course of a trial or other judicial proceedings." 
All of these terms, while not specifically defined in the statute, 
are readily ascertainable to people of ordinary intelligence. "Disorderly" 
means "conduct offensive to public order," "Contemptuous" and "insolent" 
mean "feeling or showing contempt" and "insulting speech or conduct." The 
statute, therefore, prohibits insulting (or contemptuous) speech or conduct 
or conduct that is offensive to public order that is directed at a judge and that 
disrupts judicial proceedings. In the Court's view, the statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague. The statute does not '·[fail] to give adequate notice 
to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes," nor does 
it "[invite] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197, 
969 P.2d at 246. 
R. 482-84 (alterations in original). 
As the state agrees, I.C. § 7-601-1. was utilized by Judge Sticklen to uphold the criminal 
contempt charge. Below, Defendant argued that, if a common law proscription applied, it would 
be vague and overbroad.9 Judge Sticklen did not address that argument, because she found LC. 
§ 7-601-1. to be applicable. 
The case was brought pursuant to that statutory example as well. When Defendant's 
attorney asked Magistrate Watkins to recite the elements of contempt, Magistrate Watkins 
explained the "elements" as follows: "That the statement was made, that it fell within one of the 
statutory requirements, it was published and that I heard it." Tr. p. 25, 11. 11-15. Magistrate 
Watkins admitted on two occasions that the basis was statutory. Tr. p. 25, IL 1-15. He 
eventually stated that the specific Idaho Code Section was 7-601. Tr. p. 26, 11. 23-25; p. 27, IL 1-
10. 
9 R. 312 ("The Common Law cannot Provide the Legal Authority for the Conviction because the Common 
Law Proscription would be Vague or Overbroad and Because the State Instead Argued that I.R.C.P. 
Applied. . . . If the common law were to apply ... , the judicially-created proscription would be the 
proscription identified in the Written Charge: 'disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior towards a 
judge .... "') 
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Nevertheless, the state now argues that the trial court was required to find "only 
that ... Scott engaged in 'disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior towards 
the judge."' State's Br., p. 27 (alteration omitted). Once again, the state has argued for a 
dramatically different legal justification for the contempt charge. Never before has the state 
made this argument, even though Defendant previously effectively invited the state to do so. 
R. 312-16 (addressing the common law, despite acknowledging at R. 304 that "the State never 
contended the common law provided the basis for the charge"). Defendant was charged under 
LC. § 7-601-1.; the charge was filed under LC. § 18-1801; he was sanctioned under I.R.C.P. 
75; his sanction was affirmed under I.C. § 7-601-1. Now, he must meet the state's most recent 
proposed elements. 
First and foremost, the state's argument is forfeited, because it was not raised below. 
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 519 (2010) ("As Kelly is attempting to raise the issue of whether 
the State's MSD and State's Memo, provided Kelly with sufficient notice, for the first time on 
appeal, we shall not consider it"). At the district court, Defendant addressed each conceivable 
basis for charging him, because he remained unsure of the basis even after his incarceration. 
Thus, Defendant argued that none of the potential authorities could provide a basis for the 
charge, including the common law, LR.C.P. 75, I.C. § 7-601, and LC. § 18-1801. R. 303-16. 
Nevertheless, even on appeal to the district court, the state continued to maintain that I.R.C.P. 
75 was the basis. R. 359 ("the claim that [Defendant] was charged under Idaho Code§ 18-1801 
is a lie. It is clear from the Written Charge of Contempt that it was brought under 
I.R.C.P. 75.") 
If the Court considers the state's proposed proscription, it will be clear that it is vague 
and overbroad, as Defendant argued before the lower courts. Because this Court directly 
reviews the district court, and because the district court did not rely on the state's proposed 
contempt proscription (and had never before been presented with that proscription by the 
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state), Defendant could not assert the vagueness arguments related to the state's proposed 
proscription. These arguments are preserved for appeal, and have only become ripe because the 
state has effectively asserted that Judge Sticklen erred in concluding that LC. § 7-601-1. applied. 
See, State's Br., p. 25 ("The district court utilized LC. § 7-601[. Its] discussion or analysis 
utilizing I.C. § 7-601 was superfluous"). Defendant argued the overbreadth of LC. § 7-601-1. in 
his opening brief, and the argument becomes even stronger-much stronger-when applied to 
the state's proposed proscription. 
a. Vagueness and Overbreadth Principles 
A defendant "is permitted to raise [a proscription's] vagueness or unconstitutional 
overbreadth as applied to others. And if the law is found deficient in one of these respects, it 
may not be applied to him either[.]" Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972). "A clear and 
precise enactment may nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally 
protected conduct." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). 
The test for unconstitutional overbreadth has two parts. The first is whether the 
proscription "regulates constitutionally protected conduct," and the second is whether the 
proscription "precludes a significant amount of that constitutionally protected conduct." State 
v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410 (2012). If the answer to both questions is in the affirmative, then 
the proscription is overbroad, and "may not be enforced at all, even against speech or conduct 
that could constitutionally be prohibited by a more narrowly drawn" proscription. Id. 
"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values." Grayned v. 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). These values are reflected by the Supreme Court's 
prohibition of three types of laws: 
(1) "First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by 
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not providing fair warning." Id. at 108. 
(2) Second, "laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to ... judges ... for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." Id. at 
108-09. 
(3) "Third, but related, where a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic 
First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. Uncertain 
meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries 
of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." Id. at 109 (internal alterations, quotations, 
footnotes omitted). Professor Raveson has noted that definitions such as "disorderly or 
insolent behavior, 'misbehavior,' and 'insulting language' do little to distinguish protected 
from punishable conduct [and are] so broad that they are virtually meaningless." Raveson, 
Louis, Advocacy and Contempt - Part Two: Charting the Boundaries of Contempt: Ensuring 
Adequate Breathing Roomfor Advocacy, 65, WASH L. REV. 473,477 (1990). 
b. The State's Proposed Proscription is Overbroad 
In the overbreadth analysis, the question is whether a substantial amount of protected 
speech is prohibited by the proscription of "disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior 
toward a judge." The state's proposed proscription is breathtakingly overbroad. The 
proscription is not limited to a courtroom setting or to litigants in the judge's court. Therefore, 
it would prohibit a judge's neighbor from expressing his opinion that "I deeply disapprove of 
your legal analysis." More preposterously, it prohibits a judge's ex-spouse from expressing 
hatred toward the judge for infidelity or for the judge's spendthrift propensities. These 
hypotheticals are not far-fetched and undoubtedly occur every day, yet they fall directly within 
the proscription's scope. 
Equally absurd is that the proscription would prohibit the speech, at the core of the First 
Amendment, that the state concedes is protected. See, State's Br., p. 17 ("If Scott wished to 
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conduct a press conference ... to express his criticisms[, actual malice must be proved.]") The 
proposed proscription is similar to the proscription struck down recently in a four-member 
plurality opinion in United States v. Alvarez. 576 U.S. _ (2012). The U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down the Stolen Valor Act, which dealt with actual lies regarding receipt of military 
honors, because "The Act by its plain terms applies to a false statement made at any time, in any 
place, to any person. [T]he sweeping, quite unprecedented reach of the statute puts it in conflict 
with the First Amendment. [T]he statute would apply with equal force to personal, whispered 
conversations within a home. The statute seeks to control and suppress all false statements on 
this one subject in almost limitless times and settings." 567 U.S. _ (2012). Justice Breyer's 
concurrence was clearly in agreement with the plurality regarding the Act's impermissible 
sweep, stating that: "As written, it applies in family, social, or other private contexts, where lies 
will often cause little harm. It also applies in political contexts, where although such lies are 
more likely to cause harm, the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors is high." Id. at_. 
The state's proposed proscription is even more sweeping. It does not even cover false 
statements, let alone a lie; it applies in all of the absurd situations in which the Stolen Valor Act 
applied; and it regards the core First Amendment issue of criticism of judges. The state also has 
conceded, correctly, that "Attorneys representing clients in pending legal matters have broad 
First Amendment rights to raise relevant and colorable claims in a court proceeding, which may 
include motions to disqualify a judge that contain allegations of bias or other judicial criticisms." 
State's Br., p. 16 (citing Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) and Holt v. 
Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965)). 
However, "disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward a judge" would 
encompass these "broad First Amendment rights." For example, a litigant must be able to 
move to disqualify a judge for bias or prejudice. It is a matter of due process. Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). The state's proposed proscription would clearly 
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include~ allegations of bias, if the allegation involved a manifestation of "deep disapproval." 
www.merriam-webster.com (search contemptuous). The state's untenable suggested 
proscription is unconstitutionally overbroad. And frankly, it should not even be a close call. 
c. The State's Proposed Proscription is Vague 
Again, the vagueness issue is whether the proscription lends itself to arbitrary 
enforcement on a subjective, case-by-case basis. Those who enforce a proscription-in the case 
of contempt, judges-must be guided by explicit standards. Otherwise, the proscription could 
be enforced arbitrarily and subjectively on a case-by-case basis. The next question, then, is what 
standards exist to guide judges in their determination of what behavior qualifies as "disorderly, 
contemptuous, or insolent." The answer is clear from the state's proposed proscription: none. 
The proscription lists no standards to prevent a judge from applying the proscription arbitrarily. 
The proscription is clearly unconstitutionally vague. It defines "contempt" through its 
proscription of "contemptuous" behavior, which is akin to defining "murder" by prohibiting 
"murderous" behavior, or prohibiting "arson" by punishing only "arsonists." No one, including 
Defendant, could understand how to conform his behavior to these standards. Moreover, 
without an applicable standard for "disorderly," Defendant had no way to know that filing a 
motion outside of a judge's presence could qualify as "disorderly" behavior toward a judge, 
especially considering that, in fact, no proceeding was disrupted. 
In Ashton v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed a common law criminal libel 
charge that involved the following facts: 
The indictment charged 'the offense of criminal libel' committed 'by publishing a 
false and malicious publication which tends to degrade or injure' the three named 
persons. The trial court charged that 'criminal libel is defined as any writing 
calculated to create disturbances of the peace, corrupt the public morals, or lead to 
any act, which, when done, is indictable.' 
The court also charged that malice is 'an essential element of this offense' and 
falsity as well. 
384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966). 
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On vagueness grounds, the Court held that "the elements of the crime are so indefinite 
and uncertain that it should not be enforced as a penal offense in Kentucky" because "the 
English common law of criminal libel is inconsistent with constitutional provisions, and since no 
Kentucky case has redefined the crime in understandable terms ... the law must be made on a 
case to case basis[.]" Id. (quotations omitted). Further, "Vague laws in any area suffer a 
constitutional infirmity. When First Amendment rights are involved, we look even 
more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, 
freedom of speech or of the press suffer." Id. at 200. In addition, "a conviction for an 
utterance based on a common law concept of the most general and undefined 
nature [cannot] stand." Id. at 201 (quotations omitted). Compare the state's proposed 
common law proscription to the Kentucky common law proscription. The Kentucky law is 
actually much clearer than the state's proposed common law proscription, and provides much 
more in the way of enforcement guidelines. 
Similarly, in Gooding, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a proscription of "us[ing] to 
or of another, and in his presence ... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a 
breach of the peace[.]" 405 U.S. at 519. That proscription at least supplied some enforcement 
guidelines by requiring a "breach of the peace." The proscription at bar, however, merely 
proscribes "disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward a judge." If "breach of the 
peace" is not sufficient to constitutionally narrow the proscription, then the proscription at issue 
does not come close. 
Most compellingly, the U.S. Supreme Court also invalidated an ordinance for vagueness, 
when the ordinance prohibited "contemptuous" treatment of the American flag, because 
"the 'treats contemptuously'phrase was ... of such a standardless sweep[.]" Smith 
v. Groguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974). The "central vagueness question," according to the Court, 
was "the absence of any standard for defining contemptuous treatment." Id. at 579. Therefore, 
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the issue in that case, and in this case, is the lack of a standard for "contemptuous treatment." 
Similarly, there are no standards for "disorderly" or "insolent" in this case. And because "breach 
of the peace" is not constitutionally sufficient, "disorderly" also is not. "Insolent," as explained 
at Opening Br. p. 17, is defined in terms of contemptuousness and therefore is necessarily just as 
lacking in sufficient standards as is the term "contemptuous." The state's proposed proscription 
is unconstitutionally vague. 
4. The State has not met its Burden of Rebutting the Presumption of 
the Proscription's Invalidity 
The state makes note of the fact that the proscription is content (and even viewpoint) 
based, State's Br., p. 19, but then makes no attempt to meet its burden of demonstrating a 
compelling government interest in regulating the content of the speech. The state was also 
required to establish that it used "the least restrictive means" for furthering the compelling 
interest. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The 
Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to 
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated 
interest.") "It is not enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means must 
be carefully tailored to achieve those ends." Id. 
Instead, the state simply ignores the content-based nature of the proscription, and 
moves on to discuss Defendant's specific speech. Defendant has made both facial and as-applied 
challenges to his sanction, but the state fails to address the facial challenge, instead discussing 
only the specific speech at issue. Defendant established that the proscription is content-based, 
and the state appears disinterested in contesting that fact; therefore, the burden shifted to the 
state to rebut the presumption of invalidity. The state contributes no effort to that endeavor. 
On that basis alone, the sanction must be vacated. Regardless, the state's proposed proscription 
of "disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward a judge" involves neither compelling 
government interests, nor careful tailoring to such interests. In fact, as discussed above, it 
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would be difficult to draw a regulation more broadly than the state's proposed proscription. 
Therefore, whatever "interests" the state wishes to further with its proscription, it is clear that 
its proscription is not narrowly tailored to such interests. Finally, the state has not advocated 
for an interpretation that is limited to unprotected speech. Defendant also can think of no such 
interpretation. 
5. Speech Regarding Judicial Proceedings in General 
The state's First Amendment discussion involves a single argument: that the First 
Amendment does not fully apply to speech relating to judicial proceedings, even if the speech is 
true. State's Br., p. 21 ("[Defendant] has failed to show that his contemptuous statements made 
in pleadings in an ongoing legal proceeding in which he represented a party were subject to First 
Amendment protections sufficient to preclude his contempt conviction.") 
The state makes virtually no effort to explain just why the First Amendment's 
protections are inapplicable, but the state's focus on the location of the speech suggests that the 
state believes that the speech is regulated pursuant to a reasonable "time, place, and manner" 
restriction. See, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). The state's own argument, 
however, contradicts this contention. The state believes that the relevant proscription was 
"disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward a judge." This proscription places no 
restriction on the time or place of the speech, and only "disorderly" relates to the manner. 10 It is 
not a "time, place, manner" restriction. Therefore, it is irrelevant that the specific speech may 
have related to a judicial proceeding. 
For example, in Cohen v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a conviction of 
a defendant who wore "a jacket bearing the words 'Fuck the Draft' which were plainly visible [to] 
women and children[.]" 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). The conduct "was observed in the Los Angeles 
County Courthouse," but that fact was irrelevant because 
Cohen was tried under a statute applicable throughout the entire State. Any 
attempt to support this conviction on the ground that the statute seeks 
10 It has never been contended that the motion caused any form of disorder. 
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to preserve an appropriately decorous atmosphere in the courthouse 
where Cohen was arrested must fail in the absence of any language 
in the statute that would have put appellant on notice that certain kinds of 
otherwise permissible speech or conduct would nevertheless, under California 
law, not be tolerated in certain places. 
Id. at 19. 
As in Cohen, the state's suggested proscription fails to limit its applicability to judicial 
proceedings. 11 The state's proposed proscription therefore must be analyzed under traditional 
First Amendment standards that the state has made no attempt to satisfy. 
In any event, as explained, the "disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward 
a judge" proscription is egregiously focused on the content of the speech, rather than on a 
content-neutral effect of the speech. Therefore, even if a time/place/manner restriction were 
inserted into the state's suggested proscription, it would remain true that the proscription was 
not neutral as to content, thereby invalidating the proscription. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. ("the 
government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected 
speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.") The 
proscription also must serve a "substantial government interest that would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation." Id. at 799. Even when operating under the fiction that the 
proscription is justified by time/place/manner considerations, it is clear that the suggested 
proscription is neither narrowly tailored nor content neutral. Therefore, the state cannot cite 
to the location of the courthouse as a basis for limiting speech, especially considering that the 
speech did not actually occur there. 
11 LC. § 7-601-1. used the language "while holding the court," but the state has rejected the notion that 
that section is applicable to this case. Even if it were applicable, as discussed, it is not a reasonable time/ 
place/manner restriction because it is content-based. Moreover, Judge Sticklen interpreted "while 
holding the court" to encompass speech occurring outside the court; thus, under that interpretation, it 
would not be a time/place/manner restriction. 
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6. Attorney Speech Regarding Judicial Proceedings 
The state's argument, in reality, is premised on the Constitutionally-divorced notion that 
"attorneys just can't do that." State's Br. pp. 19-21. The state suggests that Defendant 
"misunderstands the nature of' contempt, 12 and proceeds to cite a Kentucky Bar Association 
case that held that attorneys cannot "use such scurrilous language" because "such language 
promotes disrespect for the law and for the judicial system" and officers of the court must 
"uphold the dignity of the Court of Justice[.]" State's Br., pp. 19-20 (citing Kentucky Bar 
Association v. Waller, 929 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1996)). 13 The state has simply restated, nearly 
verbatim, the district court's arguments, and ignored the Kentucky court's blatant focus on the 
content of speech. These arguments were addressed at pages 27-31 of Defendant's opening 
brief, and despite Defendant's earlier discussion, the state has chosen not to further the 
development of these issues. 
Despite the limited depth of the state's argument, it involves perhaps the most critical 
point in this case: whether the sovereign may criminally punish attorneys more easily than 
it may punish private citizens. A judge's contempt power "derives, like all crimes, from a 
government's power as sovereign." In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 826 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations 
omitted). Criminal contempts involve more than mere professional oversight; they "are 
infractions of the law, visited with punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are in 
12 The state reveals a common misunderstanding of the nature of contempt, when it maintains that 
"derogatory and insulting conduct" may alone justify contempt. State's Br., p. 14. The Third Circuit has 
lamented this misunderstanding: "It is unfortunate that the use of the term 'contempt of court' 
has tended to convey the erroneous idea that punishment is to be imposed because of an 
affront to the personal dignity of the judge. The correct view of the nature of the offense which 
emphasizes the importance of the need to be served is found in the opinion of Lord Justice Salmon in 
Morris v. Master Of The Crown Office (1970) 2 W.L.R. 792, 801: 'The sole purpose of proceedings 
for contempt is to give our courts the power effectively to protect the rights of the public 
by insuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented."' United 
States v. Proffitt, 498 F.2d 1124, 1128 (1974). 
Similarly, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals has recognized that "[t]he essence 
of 'contempt' requires conduct that obstructs or tends to obstruct the proper 
administration of justice." Ex Pa rte Gibson, 811 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1991) (en bane). 
13 The state cites an Idaho case that mentions several inapplicable limitations on attorney speech. 
State's Br., p. 15. These limitations were discussed in Defendant's opening brief. Opening Br. pp. 18-21 
(ethical precepts and membership in a specialized profession), pp. 24-27 (officers of the court), pp. 21-23 
(litigation participants). 
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error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that word has been understood in 
English speech." Camp v. East Fork Ditch, 137 Idaho 850, 861 (2002) (quotations, citations 
omitted); see also, Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 408 n. 7 (1956) ("'The power to 
disbar an attorney proceeds upon very different grounds' from those which support a court's 
power to punish for contempt.") ( quoting Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 512 (1873)). 
The Kendall court recognized that a judge employs criminal contempt powers with the 
power of the sovereign, but also with the attendant Constitutional restraints on the sovereign. 
712 F.3d at 826 ("Because the government's use of the criminal-contempt power is the sine qua 
non of a sovereign act, the government has no greater authority to hold someone 
in criminal contemptfor [his or her] speech about ongoing proceedings than it 
would to criminally punish any speech.") Therefore, "the speech must present a 
clear and present danger ... of obstructing the administration of justice." Id. 
Kendall involved a contentious Virgin Islands criminal case over which Judge Kendall 
presided. Ultimately, Judge Kendall was sanctioned for criminal contempt by the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court. The V.I. Supreme Court based the contempt sanction on Judge 
Kendall's published opinion in which he criticized the V.L Supreme Court's issuance of a writ of 
mandamus to his court. In the opinion, Judge Kendall alleged that "the writ of mandamus 'was 
apparently sought and issued to facilitate [the prosecutor's] blatant misconduct 
and perpetrate a fraud on [Judge Kendall's] Court."' Id. at 820. Judge "Kendall wrote 
scathingly" that the writ "was therefore 'contrary to law and all notions of justice."' Id. He 
described the V.I. Supreme Court's "reasoning as erroneous, 'improper,' having 'no rational 
basis,' lacking 'merit,' and 'making no sense."' Id. He "offered a point-by-point denunciation 
criticism of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court's decision to issue the writ of mandamus." Id. at 
819-20. 
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The Third Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed the V.I. Supreme Court's 
sanctions. The court framed the issue as whether "the government's broader authority to 
discipline attorney speech about ongoing proceedings also permit[s] the government to hold 
a judge in criminal contempt for his speech about ongoing proceedings[.]" Id. at 826 (italics 
supplied). The court "answer[ed] that question with a resounding 'No,'" id., recognizing that 
"contempt is not discipline: the Virgin Islands Supreme Court acted as sovereign, not as public 
employer, by criminally punishing [Judge] Kendall's speech." Id. at 827. 
Consequently, the First Amendment's protections were fully applicable to Judge 
Kendall's speech. "What a judge says in an opinion is sufficiently expressive to trigger First 
Amendment review. The judge 'inten[ds] to convey a particularized message' by explaining his 
legal analysis and conclusions, and there is a 'great' likelihood that the opinion's message would 
be understood by its audience - no less than if the judge had published the same analysis and 
commentary in a law review article." Id. at 824 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 
109 S.U. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989)). Id. at 824 (quotations omitted). In fact, the written 
opinion was "pure speech,'' and because it related to "public issues," it "'occupies the highest 
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values' and is thus 'entitled to special protection."' 
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011)). Similarly, the motion 
to withdraw intended to "convey a particularized message by explaining its legal analysis 
and conclusions, and there is a 'great' likelihood that its message would be understood by its 
audience." Therefore, the motion to withdraw "triggered First Amendment review." 
The Kendall case shares several similarities with the case at bar. Judge Kendall was a 
true officer of the court. He issued a point-by-point denunciation of the decision to issue the 
writ, and then recused himself "because he believed ... he 'could not, and ethically should not, 
render decisions in the case."' Id. at 831-32. He accused the V.I. Supreme Court of complicity 
with prosecutorial misconduct, as well as committing a fraud on his court. Defendant also 
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sought to withdraw from the case, also included a point-by-point denunciation of the court, 
and also based his withdrawal on his "client's best interests" due to a conflict with the court. 
Defendant did not outright assert that the court had intended to perpetrate a fraud, but did 
express skepticism of the court's motivations (while acknowledging the existence of more 
innocuous alternative explanations for the court's decision). In both cases, the criminal 
defendant was acquitted. Judge Kendall's pure speech rested on the highest rung of First 
Amendment speech. So, too, does Defendant's speech. 
And so, too, does this Court's speech. In In re Doe, the Idaho Supreme Court cast 
serious aspersions on crucial members of the Executive Branch (Department of Health and 
Welfare caseworkers). 153 Idaho 258 (2012) ("The assertion that Father's parental rights 
should be terminated . . . certainly seems pretextual. It makes one wonder whether the 
real reason for seeking termination of Father's parental rights is the fact that 
a Department employee wanted to adopt Daughter.") The Supreme Court's speech 
regarded the work of extremely important government workers. Thus, it was "pure speech" 
on the "highest rung" of First Amendment values, and was entitled to "special protection." If 
the Executive sought to charge the Idaho Supreme Court with "disorderly, contemptuous, 
or insolent behavior toward the Executive," the matter would be rightly dismissed as an 
unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights. 
Nevertheless, the state essentially contends that the First Amendment does not apply to 
criminal contempt proceedings related to "an ongoing legal proceeding." State's Br., p. 20. The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals "resounding[ly ]" disagrees, instead placing the "pure speech" 
on the "highest rung" of First Amendment values, and affording it "special protection." There 
is simply no merit to the argument that the sovereign may criminally punish attorneys more 
easily than others. "The government's additional authority to discipline attorney speech is ... 
inapposite." 712 F.3d. at 126. When an attorney is accused of criminal conduct, he is treated no 
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differently from an ordinary citizen. The law on this point is clear. 
For example, in In re Little, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a contempt sanction that 
was pursued under a statute that "makes punishable for contempt '(d)isorderly, contemptuous, 
or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of any court of justice, in immediate view and 
presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to impair the respect 
due to its authority."' 404 U.S. 553, 555 n. * (1972). The contempt respondent was a criminal 
defendant who was required to argue his own case. In so arguing, he stated "[i]n summation 
following the close of the evidence . . . that the court was biased and had prejudged the case 
and that [he] was a political prisoner." Id. at 554. His sanction was based on the fact that his 
statements "reflected on the integrity of the Court" but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed because 
the "statements in summation did not constitute criminal contempt." Id. at 555. 
words, it was not "disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior .... " 
In other 
The Court explained that the speech "did not constitute" disorderly, contemptuous, or 
insolent behavior, based on the context of the case. It explained the context as follows: "The 
court's denial of the continuance forced petitioner to argue his own cause. He was therefore 
clearly entitled to as much latitude in conducting his defense as we have held is 
enjoyed by counsel vigorously espousing a client's cause." Id. In other words, the 
context was that the contempt respondent acted as an attorney. There is no indication that the 
allegation of bias could have advanced the contempt respondent's case, as the allegation was 
made in the summation, not a motion to disqualify the judge. It was purely gratuitous, but 
because he had as much latitude as an attorney, and because the speech was not "uttered in 
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a boisterous tone or ... disrupt[ively]," the Court applied First Amendment standards to the 
speech.14 
Specifically, the Court held that the speech "must constitute an imminent, not merely a 
likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; 
it must immediately imperil. The law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who 
may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able 
to thrive in a hardy climate." Id. (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)). In sum: 
the Court held that the contempt respondent's speech "did not constitute criminal contempt" 
because the speech was not disruptive and was equivalent to an attorney's speech; its holding 
was based on the fact that the speech did not constitute a clear and present danger to the 
administration of justice. 15 
7. The State's Basis for Limiting Speech is Constitutionally Invalid, 
Content-Based, Unsupported by Evidence, and Untimely Argued 
According to the state, Defendant's speech may be punished in order to protect the 
judicial system from the danger of words printed on paper (specifically, "disrespect for the 
judicial system"). As explained in Defendant's opening brief, this rationale was not the basis for 
the charge, and therefore Defendant was not asked to disprove it. Similarly, the state did not 
14 The state repeatedly asserted that the statements in the motion to withdraw only served the purpose 
of insulting the magistrate and acting derogatorily toward him, and that the statements could not have 
furthered Defendant's client's interests. Those assertions are false. The motion stated that it was filed 
due to a conflict between the magistrate and Defendant. It explained that there may have existed a 
prejudice by Magistrate Watkins against Defendant, a possibility factually supported by the magistrate's 
insult of Defendant. The statement explained the basis for asserting the magistrate's potential prejudice, 
and therefore was necessary for the motion to withdraw from the case. The motion to withdraw from 
the case was absolutely in Defendant's (acquitted) client's interests if Defendant believed, based on 
the magistrate's insult, that a prejudice may have existed. Withdrawal would remove the cause of the 
prejudice: Defendant. See, State Ex. 1. Regardless, In re Little establishes that even gratuitous allegations 
of bias cannot constitute contempt, if the allegations were not made disruptively. Contempt simply does 
not exist to protect judges. 
15 The state argues that In re Little did not apply First Amendment standards. Its argument is puzzling. 
The Little Court cited a seminal First Amendment case (Harney), quoted the famous First Amendment 
language from that case, and applied those principles to the Little case to conclude that the conduct 
was not criminal contempt. Other courts have recognized the obvious fact that In re Little applied First 
Amendment standards. See, e.g., United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 659 n. 28 (4th Cir. 1974) ("In 
concluding that [Little's] behavior did not constitute grounds for criminal contempt, the 
Supreme Court applied the 'clear and present danger' rationale of earlier cases involving 
contempt convictions for publications and other forms of speech made outside the presence of the court.") 
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prove that this effect occurred, or was likely to occur. On that basis alone, the state's arguments 
fail. 
In reality, the purpose of this charge is protecting Magistrate Watkins' reputation. 
Opening Br., pp. 25-27. Defendant was asked to meet that allegation, along with all other 
elements of libel. The state has failed to refute the clearly-established fact that these 
proceedings were justified solely by judicial reputational concern. Despite the fact that the 
charge is irrefutably rooted in concern for a magistrate's reputation, the state makes a bold 
concession: "If Scott wished to conduct a press conference or engage in any other type 
of public forum to express his criticisms and beliefs about Judge Watkins' competency and 
integrity, Garrison would preclude the state from punishing him" absent proof of actual malice. 
State's Br., p. 17. 
Thus, according to the state, when the concern is judicial reputation, a press conference 
is acceptable, but a motion is not. Suffice it to say that a press conference is much more 
likely to affect a judge's reputation than is a motion. Press conferences are designed to widely 
disseminate information; motions are not. The state therefore makes Defendant's case: because 
press conferences are okay, it must be true that motions are okay. 
But again, the state has changed its mind as to the basis for this charge. While the 
written charge may say that the motion was "libelous" and could only serve the purpose of 
"bring[ing] the court into the contempt of the people," the state implicitly assures the Court 
that judicial reputation was not the real reason for the contempt charge. No, the basis for the 
charge, heretofore undeclared, was that we cannot have individuals "promot[ing] disrespect for 
the law and for the judicial system." State's Br., p. 20. Pursuant to such reasoning, the lower 
Idaho courts have carved out a Constitutional exception for the judiciary's own benefit, in direct 
contravention of "well-established" Constitutional principles. Landmark Communications v. 
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839, 842 (1978) ("the law gives 'judges as persons, or courts 
28 
as institutions no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or 
institutions."') (emphasis added, alterations omitted) (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 
252 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
The U.S. Supreme Court could not be clearer that courts and judges receive no special 
benefit from their respective statuses. The opposite is true. They receive less protection than 
the average citizen, and therefore "speech cannot be punished when the purpose is simply 
to protect the court as a mystical entity or the judges as individuals or as anointed 
priests set apart from the community and spared the criticism to which in a democracy other 
public servants are exposed." Id. at 842 (quotes omitted). The case law irrefutably contradicts 
the state's assertion that fear of others' "disrespect for the judicial system" is a sufficient reason 
for criminally punishing speech. 
Because the judiciary is entitled to no greater protections from harsh criticism 16 than 
other branches of government, precedent relating to the Executive applies equally to cases 
involving the Judiciary. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Executive 
may not impose content-based regulations on convicted felons, duly incarcerated in prison. 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 US 396, 413 (1974) ("Prison officials may not censor inmate 
correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or 
factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they must show that [the] censorship furthers ... 
substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.") (overruled as it 
applied to incoming prisoner mail, but not as applied to outgoing mail, by Thornburgh v. 
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)). The Court also recognized that the regulation must be narrowly 
16 The state implicitly suggests that Defendant wrongly characterizes his speech as criticisms and beliefs. 
State's Br., pp. 19-21. However, it is difficult to construe the language differently, and the state has offered 
no explanation for how the statements could be differently construed. The state's own characterization as 
"insulting and derogatory" is consistent with the characterization of the speech as "criticisms and beliefs." 
Derogatory criticism is criticism nonetheless. Regardless, as explained in Defendant's opening brief, 
"insulting" speech is constitutionally protected. Recall that one receives constitutional protection for 
holding "Thank God for Dead Soldiers" signs outside a soldier's funeral. Surely, this Court does not desire 
to exalt the importance of respect for the courts above respect for our fallen heroes. 
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tailored to the substantial governmental interest. Id. ("the limitation of First Amendment 
freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular 
governmental interest involved.") 
It should be safe to assume that the interest in the proper functioning of prisons is at 
least as compelling as the interest in the proper functioning of judicial proceedings. It also 
should be safe to assume that convicted and incarcerated child rapists, serial killers, terrorists, 
etc. have forgone more of their Constitutional rights than an attorney seeking to withdraw from 
a case. Yet, not even in a prison setting may the Executive Branch impose regulations on the 
content of speech. As of now, in Idaho, attorneys seeking to withdraw from a case receive less 
Constitutional protection than incarcerated child rapists. And why? So that "the people" will 
not have a lower opinion of the judiciary. It is unlikely that the lower courts' self-serving speech 
limitations will effectively enhance "the people's" view of the judiciary. 
Of course, the state and the lower courts are wrong. The reason should be obvious by 
now. Regulation based on speech content is simply unacceptable under our Constitution. Just 
as prisons must base their regulations on content-neutral objectives such as maintaining order 
within the prison, courts must base their regulations on similar content-neutral objectives such 
as maintaining order within the court. The last type of speech a court should regulate is speech 
that affects its own reputation. Any attempt to do so would be counterproductive. Bridges v. 
California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) ("an enforced silence, however limited, solely 
in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender 
resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.") 
Moreover, the state appears to flaunt the content-based nature of the charges. The state 
argues that "the only pure factual finding the magistrate court was required to make ... was 
that he willfully authored and filed the motion to withdraw. The court's other required analysis 
required a legal determination - whether the content of the motion constituted contempt[.]" 
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State's Br., p. 26 (state's emphasis removed). The state is clear: once a document's author is 
identified, he may be punished as a matter of law based entirely on the content of speech. 
The state's position is self-defeating. "A criminal conviction cannot be based on the content of 
constitutionally protected speech." State v. Suiter, 138 Idaho 13, 15 (overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Poe, 129 Idaho 885 (2004)) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1971)). 
"The most basic of [First Amendment] principles is this: As a general matter, 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its . . content." Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quotations, alterations 
omitted). "[T]he basic principles of freedom of speech ... do not vary" based on 
the "medium for communication[.]" Id. (quotations omitted). "The First Amendment 
itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that 
judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a 
document 'prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure."' 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, (2010) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 
(1803)). As explained previously, the First Amendment's absolute mandate is excepted only 
with regard to the "narrowly limited classes of speech such as 'fighting words."' Suiter, 138 
Idaho at 15. 
The state has never argued that the words fell within a "narrowly limited class[] of 
speech such as 'fighting words."' The proscription is content-based on its face, and as applied to 
Defendant. The state has been explicit and even cavalier in this regard. But even if there were 
an applicable class of unprotected speech, the viewpoint-based nature of the charges would still 
preclude criminal punishment of the speech. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
R.A. V. dealt with an ordinance that prevented cross burning intended to anger 
people based on their race, color, creed, religion, or gender. Id. at 380. The U.S. Supreme 
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Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the ordinance as limited to 
"fighting words." Id. at 381. Nevertheless, it was unconstitutional, because "it has proscribed 
fighting words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious 
intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking 
to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That possibility would alone 
be enough to render the ordinance presumptively invalid." Id. at 394. The Court 
concluded by writing "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's 
front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such 
behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire." Id. at 397. 
Thus, even if there existed an applicable unprotected class of speech, it would remain 
true that the state's proposed proscription would selectively address the relevant "evil." 
Whatever evil the state is attempting to prevent - the evil has thus far not been clearly identified 
- it is clear that the state's proscription reaches only those who deeply disapprove of the public 
official's actions. R.A. V. prohibits this sort of selectivity, even with regard to unprotected 
speech. "St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while 
requiring the other to follow Marquess of Queensberry rules." Id. at 392. Therefore, the basis 
for limiting Defendant's speech is Constitutionally invalid. 
8. So What's a Judge to Do? 
While the above principles do limit a judge's power of contempt, judges may still 
brandish their most effective weapon against speech they dislike: "more speech." At least 
six members of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed on that point in Alvarez. Justice Kennedy's 
plurality opinion in Alvarez held that "[t]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. 
This is the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to 
the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth. . . . 'If there be time 
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of 
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence[.]"' 567 U.S. at _ 
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(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, concurring). In Justice 
Breyer's Alvarez concurrence, he stated that "I would also note, like the plurality, that in this 
area more accurate information will normally counteract the lie." Id. at_. "Under our system 
of government, counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose [errors 
in judgment or unsubstantiated opinions], not abridgment of the rights of free speech and 
assembly." Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962). 
At the motion to withdraw hearing, Magistrate Watkins made his attempt at proving that 
his factual findings were not falsely devised or fancifully conceived, based on his assertions, i.e., 
his speech, counterargument, and education in support of his factual findings. His assertions, 
in turn, were contradicted by more speech. The power of speech is perfectly exemplified by 
this case. The motion to withdraw contained certain assertions that Magistrate Watkins found 
objectionable. He initially responded appropriately, by addressing the assertions with "more 
speech." State ex. 2. However, he crossed the line from the Constitutionally encouraged to 
the Constitutionally prohibited when he transitioned from "counterargument and education" 
to pursuit of criminal sanctions. In the end, even Magistrate Watkins changed his mind after 
trial counsel presented him with "more speech." It was "more speech" that caused Magistrate 
Watkins to admit "that that admission was not made." The truth caused Magistrate Watkins to 
swear under oath that he erred. 
If the district court's decision is upheld, there can be no doubt that many such truths 
will be held captive in the free speech void created by Idaho law, in an affront to our First 
Amendment's core theory that "'sunlight is the most powerful of all disinfectants."' New 
York Times, 376 U.S at 305 (Goldberg, concurring, quoting Justice Brandeis). "Truth needs 
neither handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication." Alvarez 567 U.S. at _. Unfortunately, 
even after the truth was vindicated, and Defendant's statements were proved true, Defendant 
was handcuffed by a badged court marshal and sent forthwith to the Ada County Jail, all in the 
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name of enhancing Magistrate Watkins' reputation. Idaho's approach is clearly antithetical to 
fundamental American and First Amendment principles. 
C. Idaho Code § 7-601-1. 
Contrary to the state's assertions, a charging document violates due process principles 
when it fails to advise a defendant of the legal authority under which he is charged. State v. 
Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 404 P.2d 347 (1965) ("An information must be specific enough that a 
defendant will be advised as to the particular section of the statute he is being charged with 
having violated .... The deficiencies are more than a mere matter of form; they involve a basic 
and substantial right of the appellant. Idaho Const. Art.I§ 13. [('No person shall be ... deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process oflaw.')]"). 
Defendant was not only uninformed as to the legal basis for the charge; he was 
affirmatively misled in this regard. Tr. p. 69, 11. 19-22 ("We ask that this matter be dismissed 
as a consequence of failing to prove the elements of contempt pursuant to 7[-]601 or pursuant 
to 18-1801."); R. 453 ("[I]t is not even apparent what Respondent is charged with violating. 
Respondent must guess that the charge is brought under the common law, but that fact certainly 
is not at all clear in light of the conflicting information in this regard.") (italics supplied); tr. 
p. 87, 11. 1-6 ("We didn't have the advantage of [being apprised of the exact nature of criminal 
contempt] so we've struggled throughout this trial to come to grips with what are 
the charges, what are the elements[?]") When asked to identify the elements of contempt, 
Magistrate Watkins appeared unable to do so, and instead focused on the conduct that he 
believed satisfied the unidentified elements.17 
17 Q. BY MR. NEAL: You indicated to Mr. Dinger that you believe that this -- that a contempt was committed 
in this case. What are the elements of contempt? 
A. There are several statutory items that could classify as contempt. In my mind this was a non-civil, 
criminal contempt. This did not occur in my presence and so that's why I chose the course of action that I 
did. 
Q. Okay. And the elements of the contempt would be what? 
A. That the statement was made, that it fell within one of the statutory requirements, it was published and 
that I heard it. 
Tr. p. 25, 11. 2-15. 
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The above is a theme in this case. No one seems to be sure what Defendant was 
charged with violating. And thus far, it hasn't mattered. Magistrate Watkins believed 
Defendant violated LC. § 7-601-1. The state has made no attempt to prove him correct, which 
is disconcerting by itself. The state notes that LC. § 7-601-1. is merely an example of contempt. 
And that is absolutely correct, just like there are ten examples of grand theft. LC.§ 18-2407(b). 
The state is also correct that the magistrate was not required to select the LC. § 7-601-1. 
example, because the complete list is contained in the common law. Likewise, a prosecutor is 
not required to select a specific example in LC. § 18-2407(b), because that statute's complete 
list contains nine other examples from which to select. But the problem is that Magistrate 
Watkins did select one of the examples, and the facts could not support those elements. When 
a prosecutor does charge grand theft under LC. § 18-2407(b)-10., on an allegation of stealing 
anhydrous ammonia, the state cannot be affirmed on appeal based on an allegation that the 
property was livestock under LC.§ 18-2407(b)-7. See, Opening Br. p. 42. 
Instead of conceding error on appeal, however, the state essentially asserts that 
Magistrate Watkins falsely testified under oath when he claimed that the basis was statutory. 
Similarly, the state apparently claims Judge Sticklen mistakenly upheld the sanction under 
that statute, and the prosecutors and Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler all mistakenly claimed 
that a procedural rule served as the basis for the charge. It is truly dumbfounding that the 
state believes the initiating party was wrong about the substantive basis for the charge, but 
Defendant had notice of it and was appropriately incarcerated pursuant to it. 
Moreover, if this matter has been brought pursuant to a judge's inherent powers, it 
should be obvious that the prosecutor (of the Executive Branch) cannot override the judge's 
determination that the case was brought under the LC. § 7-601-1. example of contempt. The 
power, as the state argues, is inherent in the Judiciary, not the Executive. If the Executive 
wished to charge contempt, it could have proceeded with a motion and affidavit under I.C.R. 
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42, or with a criminal complaint under LC. § 18-1801. The state and the lower courts have been 
permitted to shift their rationales with impunity. It has not mattered. 18 
D. I.R.C.P. 75 
Defendant and the state do agree on one point: "the magistrate court ... could not rely 
on I.R.C.P. 75 as a substantive basis of its contempt power[.]" State's Br., p. 23; see also, Hon. 
Daniel T. Eismann, Chief Justice, Idaho Supreme Court, Contempt -- The Basics and More, 51 
Advocate (Idaho) 13 (2008) ("when I was chair of the civil rules committee, we drafted Rule 75 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to provide guidance on how to process contempt 
proceedings."). Therefore, the parties are in agreement that courts "cannot rely" substantively 
on I.R.C.P. 75. The only question is, did the magistrate rely on I.R.C.P. 75? If so, then the 
parties are in agreement that the court relied on an authority that it "could not rely on." If the 
magistrate relied on an authority that it "could not rely on," it necessarily follows that there was 
no authority supporting the conviction, and it therefore must be voided. 
The state attempts to deflect the previous court's and prosecutor's substantive reliance 
on I.R.C.P. 75: "some of the terminology utilized by the magistrate court and prosecutor below 
was not technically precise, [but r ]egardless of the language utilized in these proceedings, the 
magistrate court's substantive power to bring the contempt proceeding came from the Idaho 
Constitution and from its inherent authority, and not from any other source." State's Br., p. 24. 
The state is certainly partially correct. The substantive contempt authority does indeed derive 
from the Idaho Constitution. 
But that is the problem for the state, not the answer. The problem is that the magistrate 
convicted Defendant pursuant to I.R.C.P. 75, not pursuant to the common law, not pursuant to 
the statutory examples of common law contempt, and not pursuant to its inherent authority. 
The state argues that the "terminology utilized by the magistrate court" could not "divest[] 
the trial court of its constitutional and common law [contempt] power[.]" State's Br., p. 24. 
18 The state has not attempted to prove that Judge Sticklen correctly upheld the charge under J.C.§ 7-601-
1. Therefore, that issue need not be addressed herein. 
Defendant does not argue that the power was divested; the magistrates did not lose their 
powers. Instead, Juvenile Magistrate Manweiler sanctioned Defendant using a "power" or 
"authority" that he could not use - I.R.C.P. 75. 
It is not, as the state argues, merely a matter of "technical imprecision." The Judgment 
of Conviction cited I.R.C.P. 75 as the basis, after the state and magistrate specifically 
distinguished between I.R.C.P. 75, the Idaho Code, and the common law. R. 128 (state argues: 
"judges are specifically granted [contempt] power in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and 
the Idaho Code."), R. 171 (trial court concludes: "judges are specifically granted [contempt] 
power under I.R.C.P. 75, the Idaho Code and common law."). Before the district court, on 
intermediate appeal, the state was steadfast that I.R.C.P. 75 applied substantively: "the claim 
that [Defendant] was charged under Idaho Code § 18-180119 is a lie. It is clear 
from the Written Charge of Contempt that it was brought under I.R.C.P. 75. Mr. 
Neal asked Judge Watkins if he was referencing any code section dealing with contempt and 
said 'Does 18-1801 sound relevant?' To which Judge Watkins responded 'No."' R. 359. The state 
and magistrate actually concluded that I.R.C.P. 75 was a substantive basis to charge contempt. 
The state has cited nothing in the record to contradict Defendant's explanation of why I.R.C.P. 
75 was the charge's substantive basis from the prosecutor's and sanctioning court's perspective. 
Finally, the state disparages Defendant's analogy between I.A.R. 41 and I.R.C.P. 75, on 
the basis that there is "no corresponding legal principle that would require a court to expressly 
identify its inherent and constitutional substantive contempt power before it utilizes that 
power." State's Br., p. 25. First, as explained above, a contempt respondent is entitled to notice 
of the elements he faces, even if the proscription is a common law proscription. See, Ashton, 
384 U.S. 195 and Grady, 89 Idaho 204. Second, and more to the point, Defendant's argument 
19 Defendant never claimed that the charge was brought under LC. § 18-1801. Instead, Defendant 
addressed every conceivable basis for charging him, including common law, I.R.C.P. 75, I.C. § 7-601, and 
LC. 18-1801. R. 303-316. Because this Court directly reviews the district court, Defendant addressed only 
the district court's conclusion (that LC. § 7-601-1. applied) and the state's argument to the district court 
(that I.R.C.P. 75 applied). 
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is that the supposed substantive authority for contempt - I.R.C.P. 75 - could not serve as the 
substantive basis, just like I.AR. 41 is not "authority alone" to request attorney fees. The state 
has admitted that I.R.C.P. 75 cannot serve as a substantive basis to charge contempt. Therefore, 
the state agrees with Defendant's argument. 
E. Attorney Fees 
The state's brief is remarkable for what it does not argue. It does not argue that the 
statements in the motion were false, or even that they were made with actual malice. It does not 
argue against the applicability of LC.R. 42. It does not argue that Defendant caused a clear and 
present danger to the administration of justice or that the proscription is content-neutral. 
Finally, it does not argue that Judge Sticklen correctly concluded that the conduct occurred 
"while holding the court" or that it interrupted the due course of the trial or other judicial 
proceeding. 
Also remarkable is what the state does argue. It argues that one may have personal 
knowledge of conduct occurring outside one's presence. It implicitly argues that Magistrate 
Watkins was wrong when he testified that the basis for the charge was statutory. It also 
apparently argues that Prosecutor John Dinger and Magistrate Manweiler were insincere when 
they distinguished between the common law, statute, and I.R.C.P. 75 as separate substantive 
bases for contempt. It argues that, once again, Defendant's conviction should be upheld on a 
different substantive basis than the basis on which the lower courts rested their decisions. 
Based on the foregoing, in the event Defendant retains counsel before this Court enters a 
decision, Defendant should be awarded those fees, as well as the fees incurred below. LC. § 7-
610. 
The state's only argument against an award of attorney fees incurred below is that 
Defendant did not prevail below and therefore cannot receive an award for those fees. For 
this proposition, the state cites State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554, 557 (2008). To be sure, Rice is 
brilliantly written and reasoned, but it denied fees only because "this controversy resulted from 
a mutual misunderstanding of the court's order[.]" Id. In fact, then-Chief Justice Eismann 
dissented on the basis that attorney fees were not awarded. Id. 
It is obvious that if Defendant prevails on appeal, the lower courts abused their 
discretion in failing to award attorney fees, because they did not "act within the outer 
boundaries of their discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it." Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 
87, 95 (1991). If Defendant prevails, it is because the courts erred by failing to act consistently 
with the applicable legal standards. Attorney fees should be awarded for the fees incurred 
below. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the conviction/sanction as void; in 
the alternative, this Court should vacate the conviction/sanction and enter a judgment of 
acquittal. Either way, attorney fees and costs should be awarded. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
DATED: -~u I y i:\ z_o1J 
SIGNED ~~t-J catt: 
Eric S~ Appellant. 
I CERTIFY that on _J I J I~ ZA1 C:: O L3 , I caused to be served two true and correct 
copies of this document on the Idaho Attorney General, by mailing, postage prepaid, the same to 
Idaho Attorney General, 700 W. Jefferson St., Boise, ID 83720. 
J J I y zc\ Z.o LJ 
/~ 
t; , . ¢ 
.;4~ ., 
E;icS~t. 
DATED: 
SIGNED: 
39 
